Abstract-Vehicular communication (VC) systems are being developed primarily to enhance transportation safety and efficiency. Vehicle-to-vehicle communication, in particular, frequent cooperative awareness messages or safety beacons, has been considered over the past years as a main approach. Meanwhile, the need to provide security and to safeguard users' privacy is well understood, and security architectures for VC systems have been proposed. Although technical approaches to secure VC have several commonalities and a consensus has formed, there are critical questions that have remained largely unanswered: Are the proposed security and privacy schemes practical? Can the secured VC systems support the VC-enabled applications as effectively as unsecured VC would? How should security be designed so that its integration into a VC system has a limited effect on the system's performance? In this paper, we provide answers to these questions, investigating the joint effect of a set of system parameters and components. We consider the state-of-the-art approach in secure VC, and we evaluate analytically and through simulations the interdependencies among components and system characteristics. Overall, we identify key design choices for the deployment of efficient, effective, and secure VC systems.
protect V2V and V2I messages; Certification Authorities (CAs) manage credentials for legitimate participants (vehicles and RSUs). Pseudonymous authentication, with vehicles using short-lived credentials and public-private key pairs, provides protection of privacy along with security (authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation as primary requirements). Security mechanisms protect all traffic sent across the 802.11p data link [7] , including the safety beacons each vehicle transmits, typically every 100 to 300 ms.
Adding security for this high-rate communication would incur high overhead, both in terms of communication and processing. Consider, for example, a vehicle receiving digitally signed safety beacons from a hundred vehicles within range; it would need to validate a high percentage or almost all of those within a short delay in the order of a hundred milliseconds [7] . Even if VC is effective under such dense network conditions, the additional security overhead could cause failure in meeting the delay and reliability requirements of safety applications. This is especially so because the VC environment lacks abundant resources (bandwidth and computational power).
The following question naturally follows: Can secure VC systems be practical? Given the current system constraints and design approaches, could the addition of security and privacy mechanisms make VC systems ineffective? We address this problem in this paper, building on our previous work [8] , [9] . Based on broadly accepted approaches for secure and privacy-enhancing VC [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , we first outline how pseudonymous authentication is possible without repeated interactions with the CAs. Then, we present a proposal for reducing the security overhead without harming the effectiveness of the VC system, and we investigate how variants of secure VC instantiations affect the system performance. In particular, our main contribution is the first comprehensive evaluation of secure VC operations:
1. We evaluate the communication reliability, and then 2. we determine if and how VC nodes can sustain the incurred processing load, providing an approximate analytical evaluation and closely matching simulation results. Having determined if VC nodes have sufficient processing power, 3. we consider the overall system performance with respect to transportation safety, and 4. transportation efficiency, evaluating secure VCenabled applications for a broad range of system configurations. We find that appropriately designed security and privacy-enhancing VC systems can essentially support a safety application as effectively as unsecured VC systems can. Moreover, 5. we investigate revocation and propose a practical method for anonymous authentication schemes in VC, and 6. we discuss additional technical issues and demonstrate how our model can assess processing resources needed for future systems. We discuss the problem at hand and outline our investigation approach in Section 2 and present the representative secure and privacy-enhancing VC schemes we evaluate in Section 3. The simulation setup, our analysis, and experimental results follow in Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, along with the treatment of revocation in Section 9 and other technical issues and extensions for future instantiations in Section 10. We discuss related work in Section 11 before we conclude. considered fixed for this investigation. The second primary resource, processing power, can be adapted. Here, we take into consideration platforms that are currently used in VC prototypes, but any system should have sufficient processing power for its designated tasks. Thus, the system designer can always increase the processing power at the expense of increased cost.
The use of specific cryptographic primitives and other protocol functionalities determine the processing load for each node (vehicle). Here, we consider the basic pseudonymous authentication approach, which has gained broad acceptance: It provides message authentication, integrity, nonrepudiation and it makes it hard for two or more messages from the same sender to be linked. 1 Given the large number of temporary identities (pseudonyms) in the system, pseudonymous authentication can become cumbersome to manage. Therefore, we consider here a novel scheme, first presented in [8] , [9] , to alleviate this constraint, thanks to a more powerful but also more expensive anonymous authentication primitive. We describe these security protocols in Section 3.
We consider transportation safety and efficiency applications as they are distinctive features of VC systems (compared to other mobile computing systems) and two main driving forces for the VC systems deployment. Moreover, they are, especially the safety ones, the most challenging among VC-enabled applications; their stringent time constraints and their critical nature can affect the well-being of the vehicle passengers. We focus here on one safety application, Emergency Braking Notification (EBN), and one efficiency application, Decentralized Floating Car Data (DFCD).
In order that the appropriate processing power can be determined and provisioned, we provide a framework to analyze the effect of a given processing load on the node performance. Then, we consider a system for which processing is not a bottleneck (otherwise, the system would certainly fail) and we evaluate the effectiveness of the applications. Conversely, given appropriate design choices (i.e., equipment with sufficient power), our investigation reveals the effect of other parameters and their interdependencies.
SECURE COMMUNICATION
Each node (vehicle) has a long-term, unique identity and corresponding credentials managed by a Certification Authority (CA); without loss of generality, we assume there is a single CA, even though in reality a CA hierarchy would be present [13] . Instead of using their long-term credentials, vehicles obtain from the CA and use a set of short-lived certified public keys that do not identify the vehicle; then, they digitally sign messages with the corresponding private keys. As this is the widely used approach of pseudonymous authentication [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , we refer to it as the Baseline Pseudonym (BP) scheme, and define its operation in Section 3.1. We consider only the vehicles, as the privacy of RSUs or other infrastructure does not need to be protected. 1 . More precisely, it allows that messages produced by a node over a protocol-selectable period of time, , be linked. But messages m 1 , m 2 generated at times t 1 , t 2 , respectively, such that t 2 > t 1 þ , should not be linkable. The shorter is the fewer the linkable messages are and the harder tracking a node becomes.
As the BP scheme requires numerous short-lived certificates and keys per vehicle, the stronger the protection of privacy is sought the higher the number of identities would be. For large-scale systems, this and the cost of periodically preloading vehicles with temporary keys and credentials can become a significant burden. To reduce the key management complexity and enhance the system usability and efficiency, we propose that nodes self-generate, i.e., selfcertify, their own pseudonyms. With this method, first described in [8] , [9] , vehicles do not need to be sidelined or to compromise their user's privacy if a "fresh" pseudonym is no longer available; no "overprovisioning" in the supply of pseudonyms is necessary; and the cost of obtaining new pseudonyms over an "out-of-band" channel is avoided.
This can be achieved with the use of anonymous authentication primitives, notably Group Signatures (GSs) we describe in Section 3.2. As GS is hard to use for all VC messages, because of the GS processing and communication overhead, in Section 3.3, we propose our Hybrid Pseudonym (HP) scheme that allows vehicles to generate on-the-fly their pseudonyms, by combining the BP and GS approaches. HP alleviates the management overhead of the BP, but in principle it is more costly than BP (due to HP's use of GS). To reduce the cost of HP to equal roughly that of BP and to increase the robustness of any pseudonymous approach, we propose a set of optimizations (Section 3.4).
Concerning revocation (Sections 9 and 10), all the approaches make use of Revocation Lists (RL), generated by the CA and distributed to vehicles primarily via the infrastructure [2] , [13] . When a node validates a certificate, it checks whether the sender is revoked; if successful (i.e., the sender is not revoked), it proceeds with validating the message (signature(s)).
Baseline Pseudonym Scheme
Each node V is equipped with a set of pseudonyms that are certified public keys without any information that identifies V . More specifically, for the ith pseudonym K i V for node V , the CA provides a certificate Cert CA ðK i V Þ, which is simply a CA signature on the public key K i V (unlike the common notion of certificate, for example the X.509 certificate). The node uses the private key k i V for the pseudonym K i V to digitally sign messages. To enable message validation, the pseudonym and the certificate of the signer are attached in each message. With k i V ðÞ denoting V 's signature under its ith pseudonym and m the signed message payload, the message format is
Upon receipt of M1, a node, with the public key of the CA available, validates Cert CA ðK i V Þ, and then verifies the signature using K i V . Each pseudonym is used at most for a period (referenced in the rest of the paper as the pseudonym lifetime) and then discarded. We abstract away a number of possible implementation aspects, such as . the frequency of pseudonym refills, and 4. policies for pseudonym change, such as factors rendering a pseudonym change unnecessary (e.g., a TCP connection to an access point), and interactions of pseudonym changes with the network stack [14] . All these are important yet largely orthogonal to this investigation. The CA maintains a map from the long-term identity of V to the fK i V g set of pseudonyms provided to a node. If presented with a message M1, the CA can perform the inverse mapping and identify the signer.
Group Signature Scheme
Each node V is equipped with a secret group signing key gsk V , with the group members comprising all vehicles registered with the CA. A group public key GP K CA allows for the validation (by any node) of any group signature AE CA;V generated by a group member. Intuitively, a group signature scheme allows any node V to sign a message on behalf of the group, without V 's identity being revealed to the signature verifier. Moreover, it is impossible to link any two signatures of a legitimate group member. Note that no public key or other credentials need to be attached to an anonymously authenticated message; the format is M2 : m; AE CA;V ðmÞ:
Group signatures, introduced by Chaum and van Heyst [15] , are revisited in numerous works, e.g., [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , with formal definitions in [20] , [21] . For the rest of the discussion, we assume and use the group signature scheme proposed in [22] . If the identification of a signer is necessary, the CA can perform an Open operation [20] , [21] and reveal the signer's identity.
Hybrid Pseudonym Scheme
The combination of the BP and GS schemes is the basic element of our proposal [8] , [9] . Each node V is equipped with a group signing key gsk V and the group public key GP K CA (recall that the group is the total of vehicles registered with the CA). Rather than generating group signatures to protect messages, a node generates its own set of pseudonyms fK i V g (according to the BP public key cryptosystem). As for the BP scheme (Section 3.1), a pseudonym is a public key without identification information, and fk When a node receives a message M3, the group signature AE CA;V ðK i V Þ is verified, using GP K CA . If successful, the receiver infers that a legitimate system (group) member generated pseudonym K i V . We emphasize that, as per the properties of group signatures, the receiver/verifier of the certificate cannot identify V and cannot link this certificate and pseudonym to any prior pseudonym used by V . Once the legitimacy of the pseudonym is established, the validation of 
Optimizations for the BP and HP Schemes
We describe optimizations to reduce overhead (Optimizations 1 and 2) and enhance robustness (Optimization 3). We employ the notation of the HP scheme, but the same considerations hold for BP too. À1 , where is defined as the beacon frequency.
Optimization 2
The sender appends its signature k i V ðmÞ to all messages, but it appends the corresponding K i V ; AE CA;V ðK i V Þ only once every messages. We term such messages (M1 and M3) as LONG. M4 is defined as follows:
We denote M4 as SHORT, and as the Certificate Period.
2 ½1; , where is the total number of transmissions during the pseudonym lifetime . To allow the user to choose the right K i V to verify an incoming SHORT message, all messages will carry a randomly generated 4-byte keyID field. This does not affect privacy as all SHORT messages signed under the same K 
EVALUATION OVERVIEW
We analyze the system performance of secure VC along the dimensions presented in Section 2. Given the complexity of the problem, we employ simulation as a primary tool of analysis and we provide analytical approximations. We evaluate the effectiveness of the EBN and the DFCD applications in a variety of setups, to gain insight into the role of each of the system parameters; indicative values for these are summarized in Table 1 . We study challenging or even extreme transportation conditions, because the system has to remain operational even under these conditions. We are interested in parameters that are not related to security (and of course in security protocol parameters) precisely because we want to capture their importance for the secure VC system.
We assume that only vehicles transmit, because RSUs would always be less numerous (each serving an area with tens or hundreds of vehicles), and often completely absent; thus, almost all of the safety-related data will be generated by vehicles. Finally, we also assume that all beacons carry relevant information for safety applications. We couple the ns-2 simulator, which simulates V2V communication, with a custom module written in C, which simulates 1) the EBN and DFCD applications and its effect on vehicles movement and 2) the security processing of messages. We choose such a combination because we could not find another publicly available simulation environment with security functionality integrated and with nodes adjusting their behavior according to the messages they receive.
First, we evaluate the cryptographic overhead, in terms of communication and processing, and we choose representative cryptographic primitives, security levels, and a reference platform (Section 5) and then analyze the communication reliability (Section 6). Based on these two elements, we study the effect of the processing overhead on individual nodes (Section 7) and develop an approximate model. Assuming that nodes are provisioned with sufficient processing power, we perform a systemwide analysis for the considered applications (Section 8). Finally, we address revocation, which can be costly (Section 9), and demonstrate how processing power provisioning can be done for future secure VC systems (Section 10).
CRYPTOGRAPHIC OVERHEAD
We use EC-DSA as the basic signature algorithm [23] , the group signature algorithm proposed by [22] , and security level of t ¼ 96 bits for message signatures and t ¼ 128 bits for CA certificates in BP and for group signatures used in GS and HP. High security might not be necessary for the short-lived K i V , but it is required for the long-term keys and CA certificates.
Overhead
The K The effective overhead reduction depends on the value of (see Section 6).
Computation
We make use of a Centrino machine with the clock speed set at 1.5 GHz, which is close to the Cooperative VehicleInfrastructure System (CVIS) vehicle PC, a rather powerful platform (compared to generally available embedded processors) adopted for the development of future VANET applications [24] . We obtain an EC-DSA benchmark on the platform through the OpenSSL standard test suite [25] . As for group signatures, a well-established implementation of the chosen algorithm [22] is not yet available. Thus, to estimate the processing delay, we calculate the number of 32-bit word scalar multiplications required for GS signing and verifying; we extract the relevant data from [26] and [27] and we benchmark the scalar multiplication operation. Table 2 shows the costs for signature, verification, and overhead for the chosen algorithms. To obtain individual processing delays for a given type of message, it suffices to take the sum of the corresponding cryptographic primitive delays (M1, M3, and M4). Security levels are t ¼ 96 for Table 3 .
COMMUNICATION RELIABILITY
The communication reliability is of central importance and depends on the channel properties and load; the more loaded the channel is, the more likely it is for a packet collision to occur at the wireless medium, which depends on the number of transmitters, N, the beacon frequency, , and the packet size (including the security overhead). We implement beacons with information on vehicle position, speed, and direction, with a time stamp, and safety warnings in a payload, m, of 200 bytes. The physical layer models realistic radio propagation [28] , [29] , with a nominal communication range of r ¼ 200 m and a bandwidth of 6 Mb/s [7] , [30] , [31] .
We estimate, with the help of detailed simulations, the average probability of successful reception at a receiving node at the center of a 200-meter radius disc that covers the entire width of a multilane highway and is filled with N uniformly spaced neighbors. We consider various settings, increasing the number of lanes and decreasing the vehicle density, varying the size of N from 8 to 160; a subset of these settings (four, six, and eight lanes with average spacing of 20 meters) is used in Section 8. This metric is independent of the distance between the transmitter and the receiver. The reception probability as a function of the sender-receiver distance is presented in our previous work [9] , and it is omitted here for simplicity and due to lack of space. The results are shown in Fig. 2 with 95 percent confidence intervals and are repeated five times, with each repetition lasting 60 s of simulated time.
We note that the 802.11p broadcast communication, a CSMA/CA protocol without acknowledgments, could be modeled and evaluated analytically, for example, in terms of the probability of successful reception and throughput, following numerous works for similar CSMA/CA protocols under various assumptions (on traffic conditions, presence or absence or channel errors, packet sizes, impact of hidden terminals, etc). An effort to derive a precise analytical model for VC is orthogonal to our investigation. What we need here is an accurate evaluation of the communication reliability, as a stepping stone for our security-related investigation; this can be obtained via detailed simulations.
With the fixed available bandwidth, specific for the communication technology, the communication reliability depends on the offered load; Table 5 summarizes the load for each of the scenarios in this paper. Fig. 2 shows the estimate of the probability of reception, P (i.e., the ratio of received messages over transmitted beacons), as a function of the number of transmitters, N, the beacon frequency, , and the protocol parameter . We observe that the communication performance degrades fast with N when is high (Fig. 2a for HP) , whereas the degradation is much slower as N increases for lower values. The effect of increasing , thus reducing overhead is significant even when is not very high (e.g., ¼ 3:33 beacons/s, Fig. 2b again for HP). Finally, as shown by Fig. 2c for ¼ 10 and ¼ 10, the BP and HP schemes perform almost identically. These results show that turns out to be the most significant channel load factor. Choosing a smaller value for decreases the channel saturation and thus the processing overhead (fewer messages are sent); but it also affects the transportation safety, as we will show in Section 8. At the same time, the appropriate choice of BP and HP parameters can reduce security overhead (notably , as it will become clear in Section 8 the needed values incur very limited overhead). The almost identical P for BP and HP also show the benefit from the proposed optimizations, as both schemes have comparable overhead (with the advantages of HP).
PROCESSING OVERHEAD
We want to answer the following questions: 1) How many packets does a given node V R have to verify per time unit, in various VC settings? and 2) What is the additional message verification delay introduced by security? We consider one beacon period, i.e., À1 seconds, as the time unit, as specified by transportation safety requirements.
The BP and HP schemes use two general message types, according to the induced security communication overhead: SHORT messages carrying a node signature, and LONG messages carrying a node signature and certificate. Each node transmits one LONG message every SHORT messages, with additional consecutive LONG messages sent upon a pseudonym change.
The processing load at some node V R depends on the number of packets it needs to verify. This consists primarily of signature verifications for essentially all received beacons, as they carry safety-related information. In a given slot, if V R has N neighbors in range, it should validate OðNÞ messages per time unit. Due to Optimization 1, V R needs to validate the certificate signature only the first time it receives it from each neighbor. In contrast, V R generates only one signature per time unit, and for HP specifically it generates one group signature per pseudonym lifetime. N nodes V i ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; N, produce messages at an aggregate rate , and V R processes them at a rate . depends on the number of neighbors, N, the message generation rate, , the type of generated messages, and the reliability of communication across the wireless channel. depends on the choice of security primitives (and their security level) and the available onboard processing power. Thus, is constant for a given system configuration.
We view the system operation as a queue: We are interested in the system stability, which depends on , , and the queuing model. To identify an appropriate model, we characterize the arrival process and demonstrate that it can be closely approximated by a Poisson process. Then, we provide an analytical estimate for the average arrival rate, , and validate it through simulations. Finally, we apply queuing theory results, in order to answer the questions outlined above.
Characterization of the Arrival Process
We simulate the system and collect the message interarrival times at some V R , for different setups. Then, we fit known distributions to the empirically obtained data and perform a 2 test to assess the quality of the fitting (p-value ¼ 0:05). We find that the exponential distribution fits well the empirical data; its memoryless property and the orderliness of packet reception (any node receives one packet at a time and no two or more arrivals occur simultaneously) suffice to approximate arrivals as a Poisson process. Fig. 3a shows the collected data and the fitted exponential distribution (superimposed the distribution with the approximated by (2) below): the fit is indeed good. This is valid for the type of traffic under consideration, i.e., safety beaconing, which is going to be the majority of the V2V traffic. If the type of traffic changes, the arrival process would in principle change.
We assume one processor at V R with deterministic service times. We consider both LONG and SHORT packets in the same single queue, with no priority policy and no preemption. 2 The queue is then a multiclass M/D/1, in this case with two classes. The average waiting time, W i , is given by [32] :
where W i , i , and t i are the total time in queue, the arrival rate, and the service time of the ith (out of r ¼ 2) classes, respectively, ¼ P r i¼1 i and i ¼ i t i . The queue length, L i , can be derived from (1) and Little's law [33] .
Estimation of
An estimate for 1 , the arrival rate for SHORT messages (derived in the Appendix) is
with N the number of neighbors, P the average reception probability for messages (beacons), and K ¼ b=c 2
. We focus on SHORT packets because they are the majority of the processing load, as explained above and in [9] . From the description of the BP and HP schemes (with Optimizations), the simulations, and the derivation, it appears that LONG messages have a limited impact.
In Fig. 3 , we plot the analytical and simulation results, for N ranging from 4 to 48 vehicles and ¼ 10 or ¼ 3:33 beacons/s; we average over 1,000 randomly seeded simulations. Fig. 3b shows how many packets V R must process as a function of N, and that this relation is almost linear. As Table 4 shows, 333 signature verifications (SHORT packets) per second is the maximum the node we consider here can handle: for 1 ! 333 msg/s, the node would be unable to keep up and its queue of messages would grow fast. We observe that for ¼ 10 (most frequent in the literature), 1 increases fast toward this threshold, and the message processing delay, W 1 , increases fast with N (Fig. 3c) .
Consider an example to illustrate this: with 80 transmitting vehicles in range of V R , ¼ 10, ¼ 0, ¼ 10, and ¼ 60, and the resultant P ¼ 0:655 (Fig. 2a) . We assume a highway scenario and a simple content-based optimization: V R processes a beacon if it comes from a neighbor moving in the same direction (stream of traffic). For simplicity, if the two parts of the road are equally balanced, we consider N ¼ 40 vehicles out of the 80 neighbors in range. From (2), we obtain 1 ¼ 264:3 msg/s and from the simulation of the same scenario, the arrival rate would be 259.7 msg/s.
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY AND EFFICIENCY
We investigate how security affects transportation safety in two settings. First, we consider pairs of vehicles: one is in a dangerous condition transmitting an EBN message and the other is approaching, is previously unaware of the transmitting vehicle and must receive the EBN message. We analyze a fundamental metric, the ability to be notified early: We capture this as the distance at which the receiver is first able to validate the safety messages. The second setting we consider is more involved: We study the occurrence of collisions among vehicles in a platoon of 100 vehicles, with and without the use of security; the latter serves clearly as a benchmark. We also investigate the impact of penetration rate of vehicular communication rate, to gain insight on how security affects the effectiveness of VC systems, and the EBN application in an urban setting. In terms of transportation efficiency, we 2. We adopt this as a baseline approach; other policies and system models could be employed. investigate the performance of the DFCD application, notably the delay needed to float the information and the distance covered from the location of the event generation.
Here, we integrate the results obtained in the previous sections; we assume that vehicles have sufficient processing power and are able to verify the signatures on all incoming packets. We average over 1,000 randomly seeded simulations and present results with 95 percent confidence intervals. Recall that Table 1 summarizes parameter values.
Simulation Setup
We consider four, six, and eight lane scenarios, with vehicles placed in two opposing two, three, and four lane flows of traffic, respectively. This corresponds to a neighborhood N of 80, 120, and 160 vehicles, respectively. Vehicles are 4-meters long and are initially uniformly randomly placed along each lane, with an average vehicle-to-vehicle distance of s meters. We focus on one lane of traffic within such a neighborhood of N vehicles, which changes mildly because of mobility. In the twovehicle setting, there is a small initial "gap" in one lane, depending on the initial spacing of the pair of vehicles; e.g., when they are at 200 meters, there are initially 10 vehicles less present, or in other words 70 (110 or 150) vehicles instead of 80 (120 or 160). The vehicle velocities are initially random with an average v, unless stated otherwise; velocities are adapted according the VC system functionality and, in the platoon setting, upon visual contact with the preceding vehicle's brake lights. Vehicles do not change lanes during the simulation, and they process messages originating from vehicles in the same traffic flow (i.e., with the same heading).
We consider an Emergency Braking Notification application, with one vehicle in an emergency situation that brakes and starts the transmission of EBN messages. Braking has two effects: 1) it turns on the vehicle's rear red lights that visually warn drivers within range of sight (which depends on the simulated weather conditions), and 2) it triggers the transmission of EBN warning messages. Besides warning other vehicles, an EBN-warned vehicle warns its driver to start braking shortly afterwards. We model driver reaction times as a result of VC-enabled and visual warnings, with a random variable uniformly distributed between 0.75 and 1.5 s. We model weather conditions by setting vehicle braking capabilities and visibility conditions; for example, on a wet road, braking is possible at a rate of 4 m=s 2 and a driver can see up to 30 m. Our simulation conditions agree with related transportation engineering work, e.g., [34] , [35] .
We also consider a Decentralized Floating Car Data application [36] , concerned with how effectively data generated by one vehicle can propagate to an area and a platoon. We consider a highway scenario (platoon of 100 vehicles, with average velocity of 110 Km/h and average spacing of 30 m), with the first (heading) vehicles in the platoon detecting a situation (e.g., traffic jam, road work, etc.) and then starting broadcasting a related notification. Each receiving vehicle will relay a notification with the same content as long as it receives it from at least three distinct vehicles. We consider the DFCD running in parallel with the safety beaconing, and piggyback DFCD notifications on beacons. With 100 randomly seeded runs of 20 sec of simulated time (after the warm-up of 60 seconds), we study the effect of security on three parameters: 1) the time for the notification to reach 90 percent of the platoon, 2) the time for it to "cover" a distance of 1,000 m from the origin of the vehicle first detecting the situation (event), and 3) the maximum distance the notification propagated.
Two-Vehicle Setup
We consider one transmitter, V t , and one receiver, V R , at an initial distance of d meters, with V R always behind V t in the same lane and with a velocity for V R higher than that of V t . V R moves at a constant relative speed Áv with respect to V t , without any other vehicle in between. For simplicity, we elect s to be such that it is less than or equal to the nominal communication range at the beginning of each simulation. We choose two setups, one with Áv ¼ 20 Km/h and s ¼ 150 m, and the other with Áv ¼ 35 Km/h and s ¼ 200 m. We evaluate how the optimization parameters, and , affect the distance, D, at which V R receives the first K i Vt , AE CA;V ðK i V Þ from V t . In this setting, we wish to test the ability of the secure VC system to deliver safety information, especially under challenging conditions; e.g., V R is very close to V t when the latter changes to a new pseudonym (and private key). Therefore, in order to evaluate the VC performance alone, we do not consider the rear red lights of V t ; which, would naturally warn the driver of a V R in line of sight.
Vehicle Platoon Setup
We focus on a platoon of 100 cars along a single lane moving with similar velocities, denoted as V 1 to V 100 , with V 1 for the vehicle at the front and V 100 at the rear of the platoon. We utilize values of s ¼ 20 m, velocities on the average v ¼ 80 Km/h. We analyze how many collisions occur when the leading vehicle V 1 brakes for an emergency and starts sending EBN messages. Once some V i , with i > 1 receives the warning, it starts sending EBN messages itself. As proposed in [37] , [38] , [39] , when V i receives a warning from a V j with j > i, it stops transmitting warnings, because it assumes that at least one vehicle behind V i has already been warned. In this setting, we consider rear red-light warnings. For the urban environment, we consider multilane settings and platoons of vehicles that move more slowly and are closer to each other than in the highway settings (average velocity of 45 Km/h and a vehicle distances of 10 m, on a wet road).
We choose pseudonym lifetime ¼ 60 s. We consider the first 60 s of the simulation time as a warm-up period, during which no emergency conditions arise. This approximates a realistic situation: When an emergency arises, vehicles have already validated (identified) some of their First, we consider scenarios where all vehicles are equipped with VC systems. Intuitively, full VC deployment can lead to better safety, but it also corresponds to more strenuous conditions (processing and communication overhead). Nonetheless, VC will be deployed gradually, over a period of several years. Thus, we define the penetration rate, pr, as the fraction of VC-enabled vehicles, and we analyze the system behavior as a function of pr. Equipped vehicles behave as described above, whereas nonequipped vehicles rely only on visual means (the red lights of the preceding vehicle) to detect emergencies. We analyze this scenario with four lanes of traffic, equal to 1 or 10, to 0, to 10 or 3.33 beacons/s, and pr from 0.05 to 1.
Two-Vehicle Simulation

Impact of Pseudonym Change on Safety
In Fig. 5a , the distance D at which V R receives the first certificate AE CA;V ðK i V Þ decreases as the Certificate Period increases: If a LONG message from V t is missed, V R has a chance to receive the next one only after additional beacons from V t . Nonetheless, we observe that messages from V t can be validated in all cases before the distance becomes dangerously small.
Missing a new pseudonym could be dangerous if V R (and, in general, any vehicle) is close to V t at the time of pseudonym change and has high positive relative speed (i.e., approaches fast V t ). To capture such situations, we fix s ¼ 30 m and we vary Áv ¼ 10; 20, and 50 Km/h (Fig. 4b) : The effect of remains, but we also observe that with a higher Áv, the drop in the reception distance with is faster. Overall, pseudonym switching can be risky if it happens when vehicles are close to (fast approach) each other.
Optimization 3, not used so far, can address this problem, as shown in Fig. 4c , for ¼ 10 and with varying from 0 to 10. Even a single "pushed" message ( ¼ 1) enables reception within roughly two meters after the pseudonym change, regardless of speed and initial distance (clearly, the actual reception distance depends on those parameters). Increasing redundancy, that is setting beyond three, does not improve robustness any further. We observe in Fig. 4c that even ¼ 1 is near-optimal. Intuitively, this is because the probability of receiving a LONG message when V R and V t are very close to each other is relatively very high. If these two nodes are far apart, the probability of successful reception is relatively low, but there will be several opportunities (subsequent transmissions) for V R to receive a LONG message from V t . More precisely, let Z be a discrete random variable for the slot in which a LONG message is first received (during the lifetime of the pseudonym). If E(Z) is the mean value, the average distance from V t that the first LONG is received by V R is D ¼ EðZÞ À1 Áv. V t transmits LONG packets for consecutive slots, and every k slots. The probability that a LONG packet is first received at some j slot is simply the probability it is not received at any of the i < j slots and it is received at the jth, where i; j take values from I ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; ; þ 1; . . . ; þ 1 þ ; . . . :
The probabilities at each slot, P ðkÞ, differ, as they depend on the distance of the two nodes (and their neighborhood more generally (3) and the experimental data. Fig. 5a shows the percentage of vehicles, within a platoon of 100, which crash as a function of . As a reference, we simulate the VC system and EBN application without security. In the absence of V2V communications, 80-100 percent of vehicles crash; for the same scenarios, safety messaging reduces the number of crashes to approximately 10 percent of all vehicles. Then overall, as expected, security increases crashes compared to unsecured VCs: the increased network overhead and protocol restrictions on which alert messages can be validated delay the reception of valid EBN messages. 3 However, we observe that the secure VC protocol parameters affect the safety application. We observe first a decrease in the average fraction of crashes, as increases, and then a slow increase as increases further. This is due to two competing factors: The increase of reduces the channel load and thus increases the per-packet reception probability, but the authentication delay for a receiver missing a LONG packet also increases; e.g., for ¼ 50, the authentication delay is (at least) 5 s. Optimization 3 reduces the number of crashes with respect to the nonoptimized protocol, with the same value for , as it adds negligible overhead but manages to reduce the authentication delay, as explained above. Fig. 5b shows the percentage of vehicles that collide in an urban setting. Again, we observe that security has a limited effect on the nonsecured EBN application performance. The difference from the highway scenario is the way security parameters affect performance. This is a dense VC network, but vehicles move with lower velocities and they are more densely packed. The lower intervehicle distances lead to higher reception probability, even though the channel remains relatively heavily loaded; thus, does not give a significant advantage. Low intervehicle distances (high reception probability) result in an increase in vehicle collisions (crashes) only for high (higher authentication delay). This is analogous to the highway observations; the difference is that low vehicle distances (lower driver reaction margins) counterbalance low velocities. of crashes between 25-30 percent and none (lower than that for the earlier more challenging scenarios). The curves for different values are well separated, with more crashes for ¼ 3:33, which indicates that this beacon frequency would not be sufficient to warn drivers (although the reception reliability is higher (Fig. 2a) . Tuning affects the number of crashes when pr is in the range of 40-80 percent; for ¼ 10, we observe an increase variable from 15 to 40 percent compared to the case with ¼ 1. Conversely, if VC has relatively low (pr < 0:4) or high (pr > 0:8) penetration, security optimizations have a limited impact. Fig. 6 shows the communication performance for the DFCD application, operating on top of, thus being constrained by, the more resource-intensive safety beaconing. 4 We observe that security parameters affect the performance. More so for , which yields the best performance for all three metrics for values close to ¼ 10. Increasing reduces communication overhead, increases reliability, and reduces processing delays. For high values (e.g., above 20), there is a mild deterioration performance due to the increase in authentication delay.
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Intuitively, the parameter values affect how the network can relay the DFCD notifications. If nodes do not have the credentials of the neighbors when they receive a notification, especially as they need at least three distinct valid notifications, they will be slow in relaying it. The effect of relates to that: with less frequent retransmissions of LONG packets, loss upon a pseudonym change would incur further delay. ¼ 1 remedies this, keeping stable performance for all three metrics, even for high .
Comparing the secured to the unsecured VC system DFCD performance, we see tangible deterioration because of security: The same maximum area is covered (with an approx. 1.5 percent deterioration only), but with approximately 42 percent higher delay to cover 1,000 m behind the event (in the sense of the traffic flow), and approximately 30 percent higher delay to cover 90 percent of the platoon nodes. This is because the scenario is challenging (multilane, heavily loaded setting), exacerbated by the need to have three distinct copies of the DFCD notification. With the expected latency per hop varying per DFCD message type, but typically in the order of 500 ms, we see that delays of 1.2 sec for 1,000 m (approximately five hops in our setting) for the secure VC system are satisfactory; so is the delay for the 90 percent platoon coverage (approximately 3 km in our setting), and the maximum covered area (the total of the platoon vehicles). 5 
REVOCATION
Here, we discuss the revocation costs, based on the use of RLs. This is a largely orthogonal problem to this investigation and out of the scope of this paper; moreover, there are several unknown parameters and factors in terms of the instantiation of a revocation solution. Nonetheless, in order to provide a complete picture, we consider the revocation overhead for each of the security schemes considered. We did not consider revocation in Section 7, but we do this in Section 10: it suffices to add the revocation processing delay to the one for validating LONG messages (the first-received LONG per node and for BP and HP).
The basic difference between BP and HP (and GS) schemes is that the former deals with short-term keys and the latter with long-term ones. The number of vehicles that would be revoked is not currently known and it is hard to estimate, because it would depend on policy decisions, the size of the system in each region, among other currently unknown aspects. Here, we denote the number of revoked vehicles as R. Then, for the HP (and GS) scheme, the size of the revocation list would be jRL HP j ¼ R. Whereas, for BP ; jRL BP j ¼ c Â R, where c is essentially the number of temporary keys each vehicle holds at the time of its revocation.
c can be a large number, in the order of 10 4 to 10 6 ; but, again, its actual value depends on factors out of the scope of this paper: for example, the ability of vehicles to have frequent access to a trusted third party to obtain their shortterm certificates, or the autonomy of vehicle policies mandate. We can consider that c corresponds approximately to the number of pseudonyms a vehicle obtains at a "pseudonym refill," and we can assume that pseudonyms are valid only between two consecutive refills. Then, a revoked node running BP would be unable to obtain a new set of pseudonyms [14] , and RL BP would include only the pseudonyms granted at the last refill. Consider an example for c: with ¼ 60 s, in one day a vehicle V would "consume" 1,440 pseudonyms. Assuming that pseudonym refills take place once per month, then c ¼ 43;200; if the refills were made once per year, then c ¼ 518;400. In the rest of this paper, to provide illustrative examples, we assume that on the average c % 10 4 . The cost to verify whether a pseudonym is revoked is the cost of a lookup into the RL. This can be achieved in constant time, e.g., by using a hash table. In this case, the construction of the data structure is proportional to jRL BP j, and it must be performed every time a new RL BP is received. The required memory is also % jRL BP j Â E BP bytes, where E BP is the size of one entry in the hash table. E BP , composed by a serial number and a revocation date, is 14 bytes [1] . Thus, for each revoked vehicle (i.e., long-term identity) with c pseudonyms, at least 140 KB would be needed.
For GS and HP schemes, we extract relevant data from [22] , [27] . Each entry in RL HP is a revocation token of 32 bytes (Note: for simplicity, we use interchangeably the subscript GS for HP in terms of revocation). Then, we consider two related revocation methods proposed in [22] : the first one, we term GS-I, incurs processing costs proportional to the RL size; the second one, GS-II, has fixed costs independent of the RL size, but it might allow the linking of some Group Signatures [22] .
GS-I. The revocation tokens, each E GS ¼ 32 bytes, are used directly for the revocation check process. The cost to verify one entry is C p Â jRL GS j, where C p is the cost of computing one bilinear map. Group signatures of not-revoked nodes cannot be linked under any circumstances, but checking if a signer is revoked requires a traversal of the entire RL HP (in other words, it is linear in the number of revoked vehicles).
GS-II. The basic difference from GS-I is the calculation of the Group Signatures, which include some intended recipient, S, a random positive integer r, now chosen by the signer to have a value less than a security parameter k. As it will be explained in further detail below, this construction allows S to precompute k revocation values and check the revocation status of the signer through a simple lookup; if, however, k were low, the signer might be forced to reuse r values, and these group signatures from that signer could be linked.
As the safety beacons are broadcasted, we need to adapt the scheme to the VC context: We redefine S to be S ¼ <G; T >, where G indicates a geographical area and T a time interval. Essentially, in a given area and time, every recipient can perform the fast revocation status check. For practical reasons, G and T can be coarsely defined, so that receiving nodes can easily determine the appropriate values (e.g., with the help of their onboard clock, GPS receiver, or other localization means with the help of terrestrial infrastructure).
Upon reception of a new RL GS , a verifier V R in S precomputes and stores the k revocation values for each entry in the RL GS , at a cost of 2C p per entry. The cost to build this data structure is then 2C p Â R Â k. Upon receipt of a AE CA;V ðK i V Þ, the verifier V R performs a lookup into the table and if no match is not found (i.e., the signer is not revoked) it validates the signature. The cost to verify if the sender is revoked is 2C p , plus the lookup cost, which is negligible compared to C p . The memory needed is approximately jRL GS j Â k Â E GS bytes. 5 . We did not consider here propagation of the information by vehicles in the opposite traffic flow, or geocasting, techniques assumed in place in order to achieve expected areas of coverage in the order of 10 or 20 km (depending on the nominal communication range).
E GS is the result of one pairing computed from the revocation token, and its size is 384 bytes.
For a given S ¼ <G; T >, the value of k should be chosen such that a single sender is not forced to use the same r twice or more. Basically, it should be k ! djT j=e. However, high k would increase the precomputation costs, which also depends on how the RL GS changes over time. Investigating trade-offs due to chosen values, e.g., ; jT j, is left as future work. In order to provide a numeric example, we fix k ¼ 100, which corresponds to jT j ¼ 1h 40 min, and we summarize the results in Table 6 , assuming C p ¼ 15 ms, k ¼ 100; ¼ 60 s, and the basic operations on the hash table, such as memory copy and data lookup, to be 1 s.
Clearly, the BP scheme incurs the minimum computational overhead but it has by far the longest RL. Moreover, the GS-I method could be cumbersome to apply, especially for the platform we considered here and for sizeable RLs. Then, the cost of GS-II is independent of R but it remains higher than that of BP. Nonetheless, GS-I and GS-II have the advantage of much smaller RLs, and thus require lower memory and bandwidth for storage and transmission.
Finally, recall that for the GS scheme, the revocation status check must be performed for each message; whereas for the HP scheme, the check is needed only once per previously unseen pseudonym. It is also important to note that the revocation of a node implies its anonymity is lost; then, any entity that has a transcript of its past transmissions in a given area, can use the corresponding revocation token and identify which messages in the transcript were sent by the revoked node.
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
The introduction of anonymous authentication, for infrequent operations, as in HP, offers the advantage of simpler administration (much lower number of credentials, on-thefly generation), but it increases processing cost. This is so for each GS-related operation (LONG packets for HP). Anonymous authentication brings forth another challenge: a misbehaving node could abuse its anonymity, generate and sign multiple pseudonyms, and thus appear as multiple nodes, also known as a Sybil node behavior.
Each legitimate node that monitors its neighborhood and relies on its own sensor readings (e.g., infrared or radar transceivers) could weed out such Sybil identities (pseudonyms), as pointed out in [40] , or it could detect other inconsistencies, e.g., between the apparent density vehicles (inflated by a Sybil node) and the average velocity (in principle dropping with increased vehicle density). But there are proactive defenses to contain Sybil misbehavior. First, the invocation of the GS primitive can be regulated by trusted hardware, e.g., the Hardware Security Module (HSM) of the SeVeCom architecture [2] . A different approach is that of utilizing primitives that limit the number of GS generations per unit of time; e.g., [41] can be set to allow each node to generate one GS per pseudonym lifetime. If a Sybil node exceeds this, any such GS (and thus pseudonym) will be linkable by any receiving correct node.
The addition of new features, e.g., a time-limited GS generation, will have additional resource requirements. This is a more general concern. But it is natural to expect that on-board processing capabilities will also improve. For example, there are already secure VC boxes that achieve nearly a 10-fold increase (www.escrypt.com) in terms of processing (thanks to cryptographic hardware acceleration) compared to our benchmark platform.
In Fig. 7 , we consider processing delay for various processing acceleration factors over our benchmark platform. A factor x decreases processing delay per cryptographic operation by 1=x. We demonstrate how our model of Section 7 can yield resource provisioning as the scale increases. Fig. 7 shows that in order to keep the per-safety-beacon delay flat for a large neighborhood (160 vehicles within range, verification from 80 ones), x ¼ 2 is necessary. This is sufficient even for real-time revocation (i.e., 30 ms delay for each LONG for the benchmark platform, and 15 ms for x ¼ 2), or time-limited GS scheme (e.g., for [41] , we approximate that a time-limited GS-verification delay is approximately 2.5 times than of the "plain" GS). Note the progressive increase of the delay (y-axis) and recall that x speeds up not only the relatively infrequent LONG processing but also the majority of the lower cost SHORT processing.
Future work will include additional characteristics of the transportation environment, e.g., traffic lights, change of routes other safety applications (corner-collision avoidance), alternative communication technologies, and any roles of infrastructure. Alternative security and privacy enhancing mechanisms is another future work direction, including alternative cryptographic primitives and functionality and further implementations and benchmarking. A different but related issue: general privacy considerations, across the data-handling "ecosystem," beyond the mostly locationprivacy related VC-centric considerations.
RELATED WORK
The use of pseudonyms was first envisioned in [42] and more recent works considered their use in the context of VCs, e.g., [14] , [43] , [44] . More generally, several recent works are concerned with different aspects of security and privacy of vehicular networks: They either outline challenges [45] , [46] , describe particular attacks [47] , [48] or more general attack overviews [49] , [50] , propose mechanisms [40] , [44] , [51] , [1] , and schemes for revocation [2] , [13] , [52] , [53] , and the recent follow-up [54] that provides performance evaluation results, combine public and symmetric key cryptography to authenticate messages and is complementary to our work. The idea of pseudonym self-generation for ubiquitous computing is proposed, independently of our work, in [55] . More recently, [56] applied that cryptosystem to VANET. These works do not consider all the system-level issues we consider in this work, such as certificate distribution and application robustness. Our findings and mechanisms also apply to their work, complementing and extending it.
An alternate approach to reducing packet overhead and computation efforts is presented in [57] : it proposes that a signer attaches its certificate to messages only when it detects a change in its neighborhood, with such changes detected from beacons. In dense topologies, the results of [57] , although obtained in less realistic conditions, are comparable to ours.
Two recent works propose to use bilinear pairings to provide privacy in VANET. The approach of [58] is similar to our GS scheme, thus it would be cumbersome if not impossible to apply for safety beaconing. A mix of traditional public-key cryptography and bilinear pairings is employed in [59] ; this bears some resemblance to our HP scheme, but it is mainly limited by its strong reliance on the presence of RSUs, not envisioned to be densely present in most, if not all, deployments.
A few other papers [30] , [37] , [38] , [39] propose and analyze VC-based algorithms for transportation safety, and transportation engineers studied how to reduce car collision chains [34] , [35] . But the combined study of transportation safety applications enabled by VC and the effect of security overhead was not considered.
CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the effect of security on the VC system effectiveness, notably a safety and an efficiency application. We have provided a framework to analyze the performance of secure VC systems, along with schemes that reduce the complexity and the overhead of security, we considered multiple system operation dimensions and identified interdependencies of various factors. We strongly believe that systematic evaluation of the overall performance is critical, especially for pervasive computing systems that are tightly coupled to their users. As security and privacy are paramount for those systems, yet they incur significant overhead, designs should be validated, to show that the secured systems can be effective as envisioned and needed. We do this for a system as complex as VCs: This being the first work taking this approach, we aspire to produce and see further results for a technology that can be very widely deployed in the near future.
APPENDIX
We derive here the approximation for 1 , the average arrival rate for SHORT messages, i.e., (2) in Section 7. We consider a set of N transmitters V i and one receiver V R , all running the protocol with the same configuration (i.e., all V i use the same beacon interval , the same pseudonym lifetime , and the same Certificate Period , and ¼ 0 as a minor simplification due to the low effect of on overhead for the values recommended by the findings in Section 8). As discussed in Sections 8 and 6, each message is received with a different probability depending not only on the overall setup but also on the (fast changing) distance between sender and receiver; obtaining these values is far from trivial.
Here, we make a few simplifying assumptions: We consider some slot, t, and assume that all N transmitters send a beacon, SHORT or LONG during that slot. Recall that each LONG beacon entails a calculation equivalent to a SHORT beacon (due to the verification of the ECDSA signature), plus an additional overhead when V R receives a LONG one with a new pseudonym (due to the GS verification). We assume that each beacon is received with probability P , independently from all other N À 1 beacons. (The probability of reception is for example the average of the probabilities of reception at different distances for the given neighborhood, obtained from Section 6).
For some sending node V i , its message will be verified by V R with probability p Â P robfV i 's LONG was already receivedg. This is determined by how many times the given V i transmitted a LONG message (as we assume that the reception of LONG packets is also with probability P ). By the definition of the scheme (HP or BP), during seconds, a pseudonym lifetime, V i transmits b=c LONG packets.
The number of LONG packets from V i that V R observed (i.e., could potentially receive being in range) depends on various factors beyond this model (e.g., mobility, individual vehicle trajectories, road shape, and communication obstructions). Here, we make one final simplifying assumption: Each V i is on the average "halfway through" its current , thus, it has on the average transmitted K ¼ b=c 2
LONG beacons. Then, the P robfV i 's LONG was already receivedg is essentially the P robfV i 's LONG was received at least in one of K triesg; this is equal to 1 À P robfV i 's LONG was received in none of K triesg ¼ 1 À ð1 À P Þ K . As all of the N nodes sent out a packet, in each slot, on average V R will receive
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